J Doyne Farmer and Fabrizio Lillo discuss the theory presented by Gabaix et al in their recent article published in Nature and offer an alternative analysis.
Introduction
Gabaix et al [1] recently proposed a testable theory for the origin of power-law tails in price fluctuations. In essence, their proposal is that they are driven by fluctuations in the volume of transactions which have a power-law tail with an exponent of roughly −1.5. These are modulated by a deterministic market impact function which describes the response of prices to transactions. More specifically, they argue that the distribution of large trade sizes scales as P (V > x) ∼ x −γ , where V is the volume of the trade and γ ≈ 1.5. Based on the assumption that agents are profit optimizers, they argue that the average market impact function 1 is a deterministic function of the form r = kV β , where r is the the change in the logarithm of price resulting from a transaction of volume V , k is a constant and β = 0.5. This implies that large price returns r have a powerlaw distribution with exponent α = γ /β ≈ 3. They argue that their theory is consistent with the data, even though these results are inconsistent with several previous studies [2] [3] [4] in the same markets they study (the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and Paris Stock Exchange (PSE)).
Problems with the test of Gabaix et al
Gabaix et al [1] present statistical evidence that appears to show that the NYSE and PSE data are consistent with the hypothesis that the average market impact function follows a square-root law which gives power-law tails for prices with an exponent of roughly −3. We show that their test fails to take into account the long-memory properties of the data. This dramatically weakens their test, so that it lacks the power to reject reasonable alternative hypotheses and gives misleading results.
Here we present an analysis that properly takes long-term memory into account. This shows that the functional form of the average market impact function varies from market to market, and in some cases from stock to stock. In fact, for both the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and the NYSE the average market impact function grows much slower than a square-root law; this implies that the exponent for price fluctuations predicted by modulations of volume fluctuations is much too big. We find that for LSE stocks the distribution of transaction volumes does not even have a power-law tail, thus volume fluctuations do not determine the power-law tail of price returns. 1 One should more properly think of the market impact as a response to the order initiating the trade. That is, in every transaction there is a 'just-arrived' order that causes the trade to happen, and this order tends to alter the best quoted price in the direction of the trade, e.g. a buy order tends to drive the price up, and a sell order tends to drive it down.
Gabaix et al's method to test the hypothesis of squareroot price impact is to investigate E[r 2 |V ] over a given time interval, e.g. 15 minutes, where r is the price shift and V = M i=1 V i is the sum of the volumes of the M transactions occurring in that interval. They chose to analyse r 2 rather than r because of its properties under time aggregation. To see why this might be useful, assume the return due to each transaction i is of the form r i = k i V β i +u i , where u is an IID noise process that is uncorrelated with V i and i is the sign of the transaction. The squared return for the interval is then of the form
Under the assumuption that V i , V j , i and j are all uncorrelated, when β = 0.5 it is easy to show that E[r 2 |V ] = a + b V , where a and b are constants.
The problem is that for the real data V i , V j , i and j are strongly correlated and, indeed, the sequence of signs i is a long-memory process [5, 6] . To demonstrate the gravity of this problem, we use real transactions V i , but introduce an artificial and deterministic market impact function of the form r i = kV 
Since we are using the real order flow we are incorporating the correct autocorrelation of the signs i and transaction sizes V i . Figure 1( 2 |V ] and V becomes linear. The value M = 40 is roughly the average number of trades in a 15 minute interval. We also show error bars computed as specified by Gabaix et al. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of a linear relation between E[r 2 |V ] and V with 95% confidence, even though we have a large amount of data, and we know by construction that β is quite different from 0.5.
Does it make a difference that we used a fixed number of transactions rather than a fixed time interval? To test this we C7 C OMMENTARY repeat the procedure using a fixed time interval of 15 minutes. Figure 1 (b) shows the result: an even clearer linear relation between E[r 2 |V ] and V than before, so the test once again fails. Why does this test not work? To gain some understanding of this, we repeat the same test but shuffle the order of the data, which breaks the correlation structure. As shown in figure 1(c) , the result in this case is far from linear even when M = 40, and the test easily shows that the market impact does not follow a square-root law. Thus, we see that the problem lies in the autocorrelation structure of the real data.
In conclusion, our numerical simulations show that the linearity test of E[r 2 |V ] lacks the power to test for a square-root market impact with data containing the correlation structure of real data. In fact, even a deterministic market impact like r ∼ V 0.3 is consistent with the relation E[r 2 |V ] = a + b V for a sufficiently large number of trades. Doing this for a fixed time interval rather than a fixed number of trades time makes this even more evident. Thus the Gabaix test provides no evidence that the average market impact follows a square-root law.
Placing error bars on the average market impact
In this section we present results for average market impact at the level of individual ticks. We show that it does not generally follow a square-root law, and that it varies from market to market, and in some cases from stock to stock, in a substantial and statistically significant way.
Realistic error bars for the average market impact are difficult to assess as volatility is a long-memory process [7, 8] . That is, its time series has a slowly decaying power-law autocorrelation function that is asymptotically of the form τ −κ , with κ < 1 so that the integral is unbounded. This makes error analysis complicated, as data from the distant past have a strong effect on the present data. Because volatility is long memory, the price returns that fall in a given volume bin V a , which are by definition all of the same sign, are also long memory. This means that the errors in measuring market impact are much larger than one would expect from intuition based on an IID hypothesis.
We analyse the market impact only for orders (or portions of orders) that result in immediate transactions 2 . Each transaction V i generates a price return r i = log p a − log p b , where p b is the midpoint price quote just before the transaction and p a is the midpoint price quote just after. We analyse buy and sell orders separately. The LSE has the advantage that the data set contains a record of orders, and so we can distinguish buy and sell orders unambiguously; for the NYSE data we use the trades and quotes to infer this using the Lee and Ready algorithm [9] . To estimate the average market impact we sort the events (V i , r i ) with the same sign i into bins based on V i and plot the average value of V i for each bin against the average value of r i , as shown in figure 2 . We choose the bins so that each bin has roughly the same number of points in it. 2 Note added in proof. The LSE data that we use here contains only orders from the electronic (SETS) market. This has the advantage that the sign of orders (to buy or sell) is known with certainty. By 'transaction', throughout the paper we actually mean any component of an order that results in an immediate transaction. For the NYSE data the signs of orders must be inferred without complete certainty by comparison to the best quotes [9] ; we lump together all transactions with the same time stamp and order code. i . Error bars are computed using the variance plot method [7] as described in the text.
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To assign error bars for each bin we use the variance plot method [7] . For each bin we split the events into m subsamples with n = K/m points, where K is the number of records in the bin. The subsamples are chosen to be blocks of values adjacent in time. For each subsample i we compute the mean µ i which we indicate as σ (n) . By plotting σ (n) versus n in a log-log plot we compute the Hurst exponent H by fitting the data with a power-law function σ (n) = An H −1 . We compute the error in the mean of the entire sample of K points by extrapolating the fitted function to the value m = K, i.e. σ =Â KĤ −1 whereÂ andĤ are the ordinary least-squares estimates of the parameters A and H . Interestingly, for smaller values of V i we find Hurst exponents substantially larger than 0.5, whereas for large values of V i the Hurst exponents are much closer to 0.5. When H > 0.5 the error bars are typically much larger than standard errors 3 . In figure 2 we show empirical measurements of the average market impact for the NYSE and for the LSE. We consider three highly capitalized stocks for each exchange, Lloyds (LLOY), Shell (SHEL) and Vodafone (VOD) for the LSE and General Electric (GE), Procter & Gamble (PG) and AT&T (T) for the NYSE. For LSE stocks we consider the period May 2000-December 2002, while for NYSE stocks we consider the time period 1995-1996. The data for the NYSE are consistent with results reported earlier without error bars [3] , while the LSE market impact data are new. The NYSE data clearly do not follow a power law across the whole range, consistent with earlier results in references [2, 3] . While β(V i ) ≈ 0.5 for small V i , for larger V i it appears that β(V i ) < 0.2. As shown in reference [3] , this transition occurs for smaller values of V i for stocks with lower capitalization. Thus, the assumption that β = 0.5 breaks down for high volumes, precisely where it is necessary in order for the theory of Gabaix et al to hold. For the LSE data the power-law assumption seems more justified across the whole range, but the exponent is too low; a leastsquares fit gives β ≈ 0.26. While we have not attempted to compute error bars for the regression, a visual comparison with the error bars of the individual bins makes it quite clear that β = 0.5 is inconsistent with either the LSE or NYSE data. It is also clear that the average market impact functions are qualitatively different for LSE and NYSE stocks, and that for NYSE stocks the functional form varies with market capitalization [3] .
Even if we abandon the prediction that the average market impact is a square-root law, one can imagine that we could explain fluctuations in prices in terms of fluctuations in volume modulated by average market impact of the form r i = kV β i . However, if this were true, for the NYSE the predicted exponent for price fluctuations would be α = γ /β ≈ 1.5/0.25 = 6, which is too large to agree with the data. (A typical value [10] is α ≈ 3.) To make matters worse, the power-law hypothesis for volume or market impact appears to fail in some other markets. In the PSE, Bouchaud et al [4] have suggested that the average market impact function 4 is of the form log V i , yielding β → 0 in the limit as V i → ∞. For the LSE the power-law hypothesis for average market impact seems reasonable, but with an exponent significantly smaller than 0.5. Moreover, the volume is not power-law distributed, as discussed in the next section.
Note that we are making all the above statements for individual transactions, whereas many studies have been done based on aggregated data over a fixed time interval. Aggregating the data in time complicates the discussion, since the functional form of the market impact generally depends on the length of the time interval. Hence it is more meaningful to do the analysis based on individual transactions.
Volume distribution
The theory of Gabaix et al explains the power law of returns in terms of the power law of volume, so if volume does not have a power law, then, neither should returns. The existence of a power-law tail for volume seems to vary from exchange to exchange. For the NYSE we confirm the observation of powerlaw tails for volume reported earlier [11] . However in figure 3 we show the distribution of volumes for three stocks in the LSE. In order to compare different stocks we normalize the data by dividing by the sample mean for each stock.
All three stocks have strikingly similar volume distributions; this is true for the roughly 20 stocks that we have studied. There is no clear evidence for power-law scaling, even though the power-law scaling of the corresponding return distributions shown in figure 3(b) is clear. If one attempts to fit lines to the larger volume range of the curve (roughly 10 1 -10 2 ), the exponent of the cumulative distribution corresponding to There are approximately 10 6 data points for each stock. (b) 1 − P (r), where P (r) is the cumulative density function of returns induced by the same transactions in (a). For the normalized volume there is no clear evidence for power-law tails; in contrast for returns this is quite plausible. Furthermore, the volume distributions are essentially identical, whereas the return distribution for VOD decays more steeply than the others. Clearly one cannot explain the power-law scaling of returns based on that of volumes. figure 3(a) is highly uncertain but it is at least 3, which, together with the measured values of β, would imply α ≈ 3/0.3 ≈ 10. In contrast, the measured exponents for figure 3(b) are roughly 2.2, 2.5 and 4.3 for SHEL, LLOY and VOD respectively. It is noteworthy that VOD has a much larger α than the other stocks, even though it has essentially the same volume distribution and a similar volume distribution; if anything, from figure 2, its β is larger than that of the other stocks, which according to α = γ /β would imply a smaller α. This provides more evidence that the power-law tails of returns are not driven by those of volume.
Conclusion
We have shown that the conclusions of Gabaix et al [1] are invalid for three reasons. Firstly, their statistical analysis, in claiming the existence of a square-root law for average market impact, is invalid for the strong autocorrelations that are present in real data. Secondly, new measurements of the average market impact with proper error bars show that it does not follow a square-root law. Thirdly, for the LSE the distribution of volumes does not have a power-law tail, and there are substantial variations between the return distributions not reflected in variations in volume or average market impact. Thus, it seems quite clear that the distribution of large price fluctuations cannot be explained as a simple transformation of volume fluctuations.
This leaves open the question of what really causes the power-law tails of prices. We believe that the correct explanation lies in the extension of theories based on the stochastic properties of order placement and price formation [12] [13] [14] , which naturally give rise to fluctuations in the response of prices to orders. Further work is clearly needed.
Note added in proof
The commentary [15] uncovered that trade size is distributed as a power law in the upstairs market, but not in the downstairs market, as conjectured in [6, 16] . Trades in the upstairs market (omitted from the electronic LSE data set used here) are arranged privately and then displayed only after they have already been made. Order splitting in the upstairs market is rare. Since this commentary was submitted it has been shown that large price fluctuations in the NYSE (including the upstairs market) and the electronic portion of the LSE are driven by fluctuations in liquidity [16] . That is, if one matches up returns with the orders that generate them, the conditional distribution of large returns is essentially independent of order size. This was also seen for the NYSE and Island by Weber and Rosenow [17] . The idea that the tail of prices is driven by fluctuations in liquidity rather than fluctuations in the number of trades was implicitly suggested earlier by results of Plerou et al [18] .
